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ABSTRACT
This paper describes an economy where incomplete information regarding the
default penalty can result in an upward-sloping supply of'credit.We evaluate
the role of partial information and other related factors in determining the
elasticity of supply of credit and the credit ceiling facing the economy. We
identify conditions under which the presence of country risk induces a
domestic distortion. Next, we derive the cost-minimizing domestic policies
needed in the presence of such a distortion. It is shown that cost-minimizing
policies for a country that wishes to service its debt in the presence of
country risk calls for a combination of borrowing taxes and time varying
consumption taxes. Ifallconsumers have access to the domestic capital
market, the two policies are equivalent. Ifdomesticconsumers are subject to
liquidity constraints, cost-minimizing policies call for a combination of time
varying consumption taxes and product subsidies that will mimic the
consumption distribution achieved by cost-minimizing policies in the absence
of liquidity constraints. The policies derived in the paper are formulated in
terms of' the country risk, as embodied in the elasticity of supply of credit
facing the borrower. In a mixed economy, where some consumers are subject to
credit rationing whereas others have full access to the domestic credit
market, there is a need for taxes on borrowing as well as time varying
consumption and production tax cum subsidies. The analysis also shows that if
the level of external borrowing is substantial, cost-minimizing domestic
policies call for instituting a two-tier exchange rate system.
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(312) 962—7260In the 1980's a growing number of countries have found servicing their
debt a challenging task. Countries in balance of payments crises have tended
to impose restrictions on capital mobility, and have adopted various versions
of two—tier exchange rate systems. The growing policy concern with balance of
payments crises has also been reflected in considerable interest in the
factors governing country risk1 and in the role of two—tier exchange rate
systems as means of restricting capital flows.2 The purpose of this paper is
to integrate these two lines of research by analyzing the design of cost-
minimizing domestic policies in the presence of country risk. This paper
derives the characteristics of the supply of credit in a stochastic
environment. The analysis identifies the considerations under which country
risk introduces a domestic distortion. These considerations facilitates the
derivation of the cost-minimizing policies needed to deal with the
distortion. To add a dimension of reality we also examine the effect of an
imperfect domestic capital market on the cost-minimizing policies. Hence, we
specify the cost-minimizing policies applicable to situations with perfect
domestic capital market as well as to situations in which the capital market
•is subject to credit rationing.
Section I formulates a two periods model. Borrowing occurs in period
zero before the realization of the stochastic shocks, and debt repayment is
scheduled for period one.In case of default, a default penalty is inflicted
upon the borrower. We derive the supply of credit offered by the lender. The
elasticityof the supply of credit is shown to be determined by the degree of
uncertainty about the size of the (stochastic) default penalty. For "mild"
degree of uncertainty the supply of credit is perfectly elastic up to a credit
ceiling. On the other hand if the uncertainty is substantial, the supply
schedule is composed of three portions. It is perfectly elastic (at the world2
risk-free rate of interest) for small levels of credit, it is upward sloping
for intermediate credit levels (until the credit ceiling is reached) and it is
completely inelastic at the credit-ceiling level. It might even include a
backwards-bending portion emerging from the credit—ceiling level. The
elasticity of the supply of credit along the upward sloping portion is shown
to rise with the magnitude of the penalty relative to the credit volume. This
elasticity depends negatively on the interest rate. The analysis also
identifies the factors determining the level of the credit ceiling.
In section II we show that if the equilibrium occurs along the upwards
sloping portion of the supply of credit then it results in a domestic
distortion (for a related analysis see Harberger (1980)). This situation
provides the rationale for government intervention .Thedistortion arises
from the fact that individual borrowers treat the rate of interest as given
even though from the perspective of the country as a whole the rate of
interest rises with the volume of borrowing. The fact that individual
borrowers do not take account of the rising supply curve implies that from the
social point of view the equilibrium is associated with "excess" borrowing.
The welfare cost induced by the distortion can be eliminated through policies
that reduce the amount of aggregate borrowing. For such policies to be
effective they need to raise the relevant intertemporal cost of current
spending. Such a rise in the intertemporal cost can be achieved by either a
tax on international borrowing, or by a time varying consumption tax (tilted
towards the present) or by a combination of the two. With perfect domestic
capital markets, the two policies are equivalent. These policies internalize
the distortion, created by the "semi monopsony" situation in the financial
market. If the level of external borrowing is substantial (that is, if it
approaches the credit limit level), then the cost-minimizing domestic policies
are equivalent to the adaption of a two—tier exchange rate system. Such3
policies amount to a combination of a quota on borrowing (equal to the credit
ceiling) and a borrowing tax. This tax equals the percentage spread between
the domestic interest rate ("the demand price") and the foreign interest rate
("the supply price") at the ceiling. This policy captures the 'quota rent'
generated in the presence of credit rationing and prevents the possibility of
an inefficient equilibrium along the backward-bending portion of the supply of
credit.
The substitutability of borrowing taxes with time varying consumption taxes
as cost—minimizing policies is a consequence of the perfect domestic capital
market assumed in section II.In section III we will relax this assumption,
considering the case where domestic consumers are subject to credit rationing.
Cost—minimizing policies are shown to involve time varying consumption and
production taxes and subsidies at a rate that will imply an intertemporal
transfer of income. This transfer will allow consumers to enjoy the cost-
minimizing allocation of consumption that is attainable with access to the
capital market. A "loan" is granted where subsidies exceed taxes; and a loan is
"serviced" when taxes exceed subsidies. In a way, the authorities are providing
the financial intermediation services of a bank. Cost—minimizing policies allow
the indirect participation of consumers subject to credit rationing in the
financial market. The economic justification for such a role for the public
sector is the presumption that authorities may have a cost advantage over banks
in the provision of financial intermediation for risky consumers. This is
because the authorities can force consumers to service their debt by imposing a
needed set of consumption taxes. In general, the presence of limited domestic
financial integration destroys the equivalence between borrowing taxes and time
varying consumption taxes, putting a greater weight on the second set of
policies. Section IV closes the paper with concluding remarks.I. Country Risk and Incomplete Information
This section provides an example of the economic factors determining the
supply of credit. We consider a small economy where there is partial
information regarding the costs of default. Debt issuance occurs before the
resolution of uncertainty. Thus, the lender determines the supply of credit
based upon his partial information. The elasticity of the supply of credit
will be shown to be determined by the nature of uncertainty regarding the
borrower's myopia and the penalty size.
Consider a two periods horizon. Borrowing B takes place in period zero,
*
ata rate r .Debtrepayment is scheduled for period one. In case of
default a penalty of N/'+ is inflicted upon the borrower. The partial
information stems from the assumption that the lender has only incomplete
information regarding '. Apossible economic interpretation of 'isas
the discount factor applied for a penalty to be inflicted in the future
(period two). Let N be the cost of being excluded from the international
credit market in the future due to a default in period 1; and be the
effective discount factor that translates the future penalty (N) into N/
in terms of period one. Thus, can be viewed as a myopia measure, where a
higher corresponds to a smaller weight attached to the future. For
example, if the default decision is determined by a party whose political
horizon is limited, will reflect the myopia of the decision maker.
Alternatively, the analysis can apply for the case of partial information
regarding the size of the penalty N: let the default penalty (N) be
proportional to output (or export) in period one. The term i'may reflect
a stochastic productivity term.
Default will take place if the penalty falls short of the debt.3
(1) (1 +r*)B > N/'S
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The lender's information regarding 4)is summarized by a distribution. To
gain tractability we assume an exponential distribution:
+ ,where0 ￿ r ￿ c
and the density function of is
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Ase ÷0 ,weapproach the case of full information regarding the default
penalty. With complete information (0),defaultwill take place only if
* *
B>N/[(1+rf)w01
,where e and rfis the risk free interest
rate. Thus, in such a case the borrower will face a supply of credit given
by abc (Figure 1), where BR is the credit ceiling. We assume that the
borrowing country is small. Thus, in the absence of risk it faces an elastic
supply of credit, at the risk free rate (r)
Let us consider now the case of uncertain 4)(i. e., >O).In
general, equation 1 implies that for values of B smaller than
BLN/[(1 +r) y0eEJthe default probability is zero, because '"0e.
Thus,the supply of credit is elastic till BL .ForB >
BLwe expect
positive incidence of default. Thus, for B > BL we expect r > rf







































































(5) (1 +r*)P 1
*
whereP is the probability of no default (PP((1 +r)B)) .Equation5
defines the supply of credit. It implies that along the supply of credit
(6)
d log B -1-
where -—dlog P
>
d log (1 +r*)
-
n d log[(1 +r*)B]
Iotice that for 0 ￿ q<1the supply of credit is either elastic or upward
sloping. For ri>1the supply of credit bends backwards. Maximization
implies that the borrowing country will not operate on the backward bending
portion of the supply of credit.5 Thus, a credit ceiling is reached when
d log B/d log (1 +r*)￿ 0 .Toconclude the specification of the supply
schedule, let us determine the credit ceiling, denoted by B .Ingeneral,
we should distinguish between two cases. If BL is on the backward bending part
of' the supply curve (defined by equation 5), then BBL (recall that BL is the
largest B that is consistent with P 1) .Otherwise,the credit ceiling is
reached when n 1 (or, equivalently, when d log B/d log (1 +r*) 0).In terms
of our example, the supply curve is defined by:
(7) (1 +r*)P[t < n —b— — 1+r
where P[r < n -b-r*-4]is the probability of repayment. Using (4)
this probability is given by
1 for BL>B
(8) P[T < fl- b-- B(1+
[1- ] for >/B>B
1 —eE
where stands for the debt ceiling.7
Thus, for >B>
BL
the interest rate ris defined by
*
* B(1+r)'L' *
(9) (1÷r)[1— N ](1+rf)(1—e)
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Applying this information to (9) it follows that the credit ceiling
- * 7 (B) and the corresponding interest rate Cr )are
(11)
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These characteristics of the supply of credit are summarized in figure
1. The case of full information ( 0) corresponds to abc. Positive
values of c ,butsmaller than Ln 2 ,areassociated with a supply
schedule adh. Finally, for >n2 the supply schedule becomes akim.
P. higher value of reduces the credit ceiling, as reflected by schedule
ak'i'm. The elasticity of the supply of credit along the upward sloping
portion ki is given by equation (10). Higher values of the interest rate
and of the myopia index () are associated with higher credit-supply
elasticity. Likewise, the elasticity rises with the ratio of the penalty (N)
relative to the volume of credit.8
The determinants of the credit ceiling can be summarized by
(12) BB(c, 0, re,) where
(13) a. —<0 b. —i < 0 c. < 0
arf
E
Ingeneral, a higher myopia index (dip0 > 0), a higher risk-free interest
rate and a igher uncertainty concerning the penalty of default (dC > 0) are
associated with a lower credit ceiling. Our analysis has demonstrated that
the degree of uncertainty plays an important role in the determination of the
supply of credit. For "mild't uncertainty (thatis, for< in 2) the
supply of' credit is elastic for credit levels below the ceiling. If the
uncertainty exceeds a certain threshold (e > in 2), the supply of
credit is upward sloping for a credit volume that is below the ceiling
(BL < B < B)
While our discussion has been conducted for a special distribution, the
main results apply for a general distribution. For example, let f(p) denote
a general distribution of ip .Itcan be shown that the elasticity of the
probability of no default with respect to indebtedness (n) equals to
(6')
where F(p) j f'(y)dy is the cumulative distribution of f. Equation (6')
reveals that the shape of the supply of credit is determined by the character-
istics of the distribution f.it is backwards—bending for values of 8(1 +r*)that
* *
satisfythe condition that f [log (N/(B(1 +r)))] > F[logUJ/(B(1 +r)))]
It can be shown that a large class of the distributions f(ip)(including the
normal distribution) yields a supply of credit of the type reported in Figure
1——a supply curve that is perfectly elastic for small level of credit (at the
*
worldrisk-free rate of' interest), is backward-bending for large enough r , and the9
elasticity of supply drops with the interest rate. Furthermore, the main
arguments made in the subsequent analysis are independent of the shape of
f(14))
In the next section we derive the cost minimizing domestic policies for a
small economy operating along the upward sloping portion of the supply of
credit.
II. Optimal Domestic Policies
The purpose of this section is to derive optimal domestic policies in the
presence of the supply characterized by (5). It is useful to start with a
real model, because the design of the optimal policies can be shown to be
independent of monetary considerations. Consider a one-good open economy that
faces given international prices. Let the utility of a representative
consumer be given by
(114) Uu(X0) +pu(X1)
where pstandsfor the subjective rate of time preference and is the
consumption at time i. The domestic interest rate, r,is defined by
*
(15) rr(1-*-a)
where r* is defined by the supply of credit (5) and is the domestic tax on
borrowing. We assume that the country is a net debtor in period zero, thus
*
equation(15) defines the domestic interest rate. Let 6, 6denote,
respectively, the discount factors gross and net of borrowing taxes
* *
(6 11(1 +r);6 1/(1 +r)).Theauthorities can use consumption taxes
and subsidies, as well as borrowing taxes. The private-sector budget
constraints are
(16a) (1 +e0)X0X+ B +
(16b) B(1 +r)+(1+e1)X10
(16c) X X1 —
where(8, 9) are the consumption taxes in periods 0 and 1, (X, X) is
consumption in period one for the case default and no default, respectively;
(X0, X1) is the endowment, R0 is the transfer in period 0 and we assume that
foreign prices are one. Equations (16b) and (16c) are the budget constraints
for period one for the case of no default and default, respectively. To
simplify exposition, we assume that 01 is applied only in case of no
default. Combining (16a) and (16b) yields an intertemporal budget
constraint:
(17) (1 + + 6(1+o1)XX0 +6•1 +R0
The specification of the budget constraint embodies the notion that the
consumer is the owner of the claims on output (, ).
The consumer's problem is to allocate consumption so as to maximize his
expected utility subject to the budget constraint. Let V denote the value of
the expected utility. In computing this value, the expectations are taken in
period zero, based upon the information regarding the distribution of '!
*
denotedby g(') .Let the ratio Ni[B(1 +r)J be denoted by Z.It follows
that
z
(18) Vu(X0) + u(X)g()d
+f u(X1
- - z
ThusV is a function of three argumets:
(19) V
V(X0, X, Z)
In maximizing V subject to the budget constraint (17), the consumer
chooses in period zero the values of X0 and X' .This maximization yields
the first order conditions (20)—(21):11




whereX is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint (17) and
v for any y.In deriving these first-order conditions, we are using
the fact that each consumer treats r as given. As the subsequent analysis
reveals this price—taker behavior brings about a distorted domestic
equilibrium.
To close the model, we specify the supply of credit facing the small
country. The determination of the interest rate is represented by a negative
*
functionaldependency between the net discount factor (6 )and the level of
indebtedness:
** *
(22) 6 6 (B(1 +r*)) ,(5)' < 0.
Equation (22) is a reduced form equation, which is derived from (5).t'Jotice
that equation (6) implies that
(23) d log B- 1—
n dlog 6
where n was defined in (6).
The value of n reflects the degree of integration of the domestic
economy with the international financial market. Equation (23) implies that
as riapproachesunity, the economy approaches a credit ceiling under which a
further rise in the interest rate r* does not increase the credit offered to
the country. Alternatively, as n approaches zero we approach the case of
full integration, where the country risk factor is absent. Therefore, a value
of n that is close to one reflects a high degree of financial segmentation
of the domestic economy. For the purpose of our discussion we take n as
given, focusing on the design of optimal domestic policies.12
The set of optimal policies is derived in two stages. First, we derive
the change in the expected utility of a representative consumer due to a
revenue—neutral change in taxes. e then apply this expression to compute the
implied restrictions on optimal policies. To simplify, we neglect the role of
the public sector; hence we assume that the net revenue of' all taxes and
transfers is zero. Thus, the economy-wide budget constraint implies that:8
(2k) [X0 - + - X1}
Equation (214) reflects the fundamental budget constraint: using the
external prices, net present value of borrowing is zero.In general, the
marginal change in welfare can be approximated by
vxn
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The economy-wide budget constraint (24) and the supply of credit (22)
imply that the net present value of changes in net borrowing in both periods
should add up to zero, where the relevant discount factor is the social
*
discount factor, (1 -ri):
(27) A(X0 -) + A(X
-1)*(1
-n)0
From equation (27) we infer a value of AX0 .Wesubstitute this value
for AX0 into (26), and obtain the final expression for the change in utility:13
6(1 +0)*
(28) — { — o(1—n)JX
vi+e
Equation(28) is a reduced-form expression in which (as usual) the change in
welfare is described as the sum of changes in quantities, weighted by the
initial distortions(see Harberger (1971)). This expression is useful in
assessing the set of optimal policies because optimality requires that the




The presence of country risk calls for policies that equate the private
intertemP:ral relative prices 6(1 +e)/(1
+
Go)tothe social discount






The targeted change in the intertemporai. relative prices can be achieved by a
*
combinationof borrowing tax (1r )anduniform, time varying consumption
taxes that are tilted towards the present (Go -
01
>0).Itis noteworthy
that (29') applies only for small values of all the parameters. For example,
(29) implies that as qapproachesunity (as is the case in the presence of
credit rationing), approaches infinite.11 At the limit (n 1)
optimality calls for a quota on borrowing and a corresponding optimal
borrowing tax. Notice that under a binding credit ceiling
(BB) the domestic interest rate is demand determind, generating
—— ___*
a'rent'. This rent equals to B(r -r), wherer is the interest rate
_* thatclears the domestic market for BB, and ris the interest rate1L
charged by lenders when B is marginally below the credit ceiling B
This argument is summarized in Figure 1.If the supply of credit is akim, and
the demand by D, the 'quota rent' is the shaded area in Figure 1. The optimal
policy is a quota B and a borrowing tax a ,where
—_* _*
a(r -r)/r .Thetax is designed to capture the rent, preventing it from
being captured by foreigh lenders. This policy can be implemented in the form
of a two-tier regime, where the domestic interest rate is endogenously de-
termined by the spread between the financial and the commercial exchange
rates. Thus, our analysis demonstrates that a two-tier exchange rate can
be the outcome of an equilibrium response of the domestic authorities to
credit rationing by foreign creditors--when a borrower approaches the
inelastic portion of the supply of credit, optimality calls for a borrowing
tax at a rate defined by the spread between the domestic and the foreign
— .__*_.* interestrate ((r —r)/r ).Notethat as n-l there is
important role for the quota --to prevent an equilibrium along the
backward bending portion of the supply of credit. 12
Equation (29) implies that there is a redundancy of an instrument, in the
sense that a tax on borrowing can be substituted by time varying uniform
consumption taxes. This apparent redundancy reflects the assumption that all
consumers have full access to the domestic financial market. We turn now to
an analysis of optimal policies in the presence of credit rationing.
III. Liquidity Constraints
The previous section derived optimal policies in the presence of country
risk for the case where consumers have full access to the domestic capital
market. Sometimes, however, enough consumers face effective credit rationing
to pose the question of what policies might be optimal in the presence of
liquidity constraints. While the economic explanation for the extent to which15
credit rationing is binding is beyond the scope of the present paper, it is
useful to make the following observations.13 Countries subject to country
risk tend to be countries in which the sophistication of their domestic credit
market is limited. These countries also tend to apply for credit assistance
during severe recessions. Both of the above conditions tend to be associated
with the presence of credit rationing. Thus, it is desirable to assess the
role of domestic policies for the case of country risk and liquidity
constraints.
Suppose that the consumer described in Section II is facing credit






(1 + -- R0
(19'c) BC
(1 + - 0
The terms H0, R include terms related to the intertemporal transfer of
income allowed by the existing level of credit offered to the consumer. What
is relevant, however, is that at the margin our consumer is effectively
rationed in the credit market. For simplicity of exposition, we consider the
case where H0 H z 0 .Thepublic sector chooses the set of taxes cum
subsidies as to maximize the expected utility of a representative consumer.
Formally, this is equivalent to optimizing equation (18) subject to the budget
constraint (2L) and the external supply of credit (22). We can obtain the
optimal policies by applying the two stages procedure used in section II.
Notice that equation (25) still holds as a measure of the change in utility
due to marginal change in policies. Note also that equation (27), the16







Therestrictions on optimal policies are obtained by equating the coefficient
in (30) to zero, yielding
*
(31) (1 —
Equation(31) implies that intertemporal taxes should be imposed in such a way
as to equate the ratio of private intertemporal marginal utilities of
*
consumption()tothe social discount rate (o (1 -n)).This is also the
condition that institutes the Ricardian equivalence proposition.h24 For small
*
valuesof r , - 1,we can approximate (31) by:
(31') 1 — —
Acomparison of the conditions for an optimal path of taxes between the cases
of liquidity constraint (31') and full access to the domestic financial market
(29') reveals that liquidity constraints destroy the equivalence between time
varying consumption taxes (and production subsidies) and taxes on
borrowings. For a consumer subject to credit rationing, taxes on borrowing
are not relevant because they do not affect his behavior. Thus, the presence
of credit rationing implies that the optimal intertemporal allocation should
be achieved via uniform, time varying consumption and production taxes and
subsidies. The optimal set of policies would mimic the intertemporal
allocation of consumption for a consumer with access to the domestic financial
market. This can be accomplished by applying taxes cuzn subsidies as a means17
of intertemporal transfer of income. In designing such a policy, the public
sector provides the intermediation services of a bank to consumers who are
excluded from the credit market. A "loan" is granted where subsidies exceed
taxes, and the loan is "serviced" when taxes exceed subsidies. The economic
justification for such a role for the public sector is the implicit assumption
that the authorities have a cost advantage over banks in the provision of
financial intermediation for risky consumers. This is because the authorities
can force consumers to service their debt by imposing a needed set of
consumption taxes. Thus, the argument for the application of the optimal
policies described above necessitates a sound fiscal system with the capacity
to enforce taxes.
The above arguments are illustrated with the following Cobb-Douglas
model. Let the utility of a representative consumer be given by:
(32) Ulog X0 +p logX1
We consider now the case where the consumer lacks access to financial
markets. If (La, ) stands for the endowment vector, equation (18)




Applying (33) to (31) yields the following condition for optimal
policies:
0+1 * *





For small values of n, Oo, 01 we get18
(35) log [/(;1/0)] + -
Thefirst term in (35) measures the endowment bias towards period zero. Note
that with full access to financial markets, a consumer facing a discount rate
will choose a consumption path such that 6fX1/X0 p.Thus,if the first
term is zero, the intertemporal distribution of endowment coincides with the
desired distribution of consumption, whereas a negative value reflects an
endowment bias towards period one. Equation (35) implies that the inter—
temporal path of net taxes is determined by country risk and by the endowment
bias. Assuming that the design of taxes O, is such that the net present
value of government revenue is zero15, we can infer that for small values of
¶ p)-1]the optimal values of taxes are given by
-w[log - n] <0
(36)
-w)[1og{1/(0p)}-'>0
where w + X1],and we are assuming that the country is a
borrower in period zero (or that the endowment bias towards period one exceeds
the country risk factor, i).Suppose that we start with no endowment bias
p)andno country risk (ii0).In such a case, no policies are
called for. This is also the case where a consumer with full access to the
credit market would not borrow. Suppose now that there is a drop in income in





——a (1— ) >0
Xo19
Thus, optimal policies call for a net subsidy in period zero and a net tax in
period one. Such a policy transfers income from period one to period zero.
This is also the case in which a consumer who has access to the credit market
borrows in period zero.
16
Suppose now that the transitory drop in income in period zero comes with
a rise in country risk (n). Higher country risk weakens the use of the
subsidy cum tax scheme as a means of intertemporal transfer of income. This
is also the case in which borrowing by the consumers who have access to the
credit market should be taxed. In general, optimal policies allow the con-
sumer who is subject to credit rationing to use the credit market indirectly
in order to smooth the path of consumption over time.
It is relevant to note that in a mixed economy, where some consumers are
subject to liquidity constraints, whereas others have full access to the
domestic credit market, there is a need for taxes on borrowing as well as for
time varying consumption cum production taxes and subsidies. In such a case
(31) defines the path of consumption curn production taxes, and (29) defines
the borrowing tax that is consistent with the path of consumption taxes.17
A potential difficulty of our analysis in this section is the lack of
additional channels that allow a consumer subject to credit rationing to
smooth consumption. These channels include investment in productive capital
and the presence of money. It can be shown that the main results remain
intact in the presence of these channels. Finally, while our discussion was
formulated in terms of a one good model, it can also be varified that (because
optimal policies do not affect within-period relative prices) all the results
regarding optimal policies hold for a two (or ri) goods model.1820
IV. Concluding Remarks
Rather than repeating the summary from the introduction, we conclude with
an outline of possible extensions. Throughout the paper we have evaluated the
conditions under which the presence of country risk can introduce a domestic
distortion, and we have studied the implied characteristics of the supply of
credit and the optimal domestic policies. We considered a simple example in
which there is incomplete information regarding the default penalty. The
present paper does not allow for the possibility of a direct feedback between
the borrower's policies and the evaluation of the country risk. An extension
that allows for such a possibility would be useful, bringing up issues related
to credibility and reputation.21
Footnotes
1See for example, Harberger (1976, 1980); Eaton and Gersovitz (1981);
Cooper and achs (19814), Sachs (19814); Edwards (19814, 1985); Dornbusch (1985).
20n the economics of a two—tier exchange rates see, for example, Flood
and Marion (1982), Bhandari and Decaluwe (1983), Obstfeld (19814), Adams and
Greenwood (1985), Aizenman (1985), Frenkel and Razin (1985) and Von Wijnbergen
(1985).
3For a related discussion, see Sachs (19814) and Eaton (1985).
14Notice that a higher cimplies a higher mean and a higher variance of
•The main results of our analysis would not be affected if we consider a
mean preserving changes in c
5As will be shown in section 3, this consideration may justify the need
to apply a two-tier exchange rate system (i.e. a quote on borrowing combined
with an optimal tax).
*
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Equation(10) implies that for in 2 d log B/d log (1 +r) 0
at BL ,andthat for <in2 d log B/d log (1 +r*)< 0 at BL. Thus,
B for c ￿in2 .Fore >in2 B is obtained by noting that (10)
implies that N/[(1 +r) B] 2 .Byapplying this information to (9) we
obtain the solution for (r ,B)
8Equation (214) can be obtained by summing the private and the public
sector budget constraints, while remaining aware that each sector faces a
different discount rate. For the details of such a calculation (though in a
different context) see Aizenman (1985).
9For a related study see Jones (1967), who derived the optimal tariff and
tax on capital inflows in the presence of market power, and Harberger (1980).22
100ur analysis has been conducted for the case of an incomplete and
symmetric information regarding .Itcan be extended to allow for
asymmetric information by allowing different density functions g() for the
lender and the borrower. Let g(") g(\i1) stand for the density function
from the borrower and lender perspectives, respectively. In such a case the
supply of credit (5) is determined according to (i.e., P in (5) should be
replaced by L' Lg(t)d)
,whereasthe expected utility (18) is
determined by applying g(i.e., g in (18) should be replaced by ge).It
can be shown that the optimal domestic policy is defined by (29), where riis
replaced by L d log PL/d log((1 +
r:)B))
(1 +r)[e1 — + (1 +
11From(29) we infer that *
(1 —ri)r (1 + e)
12For example, if the supply curve is akl (Figure 1), the 'shadow' supply
curve defined by (9) includes a backward bending section ('in' in Figure 1). The
optimal policy has also the consequence of excluding
equilibria along the backward bending portion of akin (equilibria that are
—*_* inferiorrelative to the one obtained with BB, r r and rr)
13For a study on liquidity constraints in a macro context, see Scheinkman
and Weiss (1984). For a survey on tests for liquidity constraints see Hayashi
(1985).
revenue nuetral policy that reduces taxes in period zero and raises




Xo (1 + B1)
(1 —) the Ricardian equivalence proposition hold: welfare is not
affected by a marginal change in the timing of taxes.
15Formally, it requires that X0 + +
,which,using the consumer
80 *_ 31
budget constraints for periods zero and one implies A0
1
-
1 + e 023
l6Notice that if the drop in income is permanent, such that is
not affected, rio policies are called for.
17Note that in the presence of heterogeneous consumers subject to credit
rationing and the lack of transfer policies conditional on income, optimal
policies are not capable of mimicking the intertemporal distribution achieved
without credit rationing.
18Notice that in the presence of two goods a desired path of81 -80
can be obtained by imposing tariffs and export subsidies at an equal rate
(e in period i, i0, 1).24
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